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T HE 1947 cases covering points of Texas corporation law were
less numerous than might be expected. Of these still fewer
made any noteworthy changes in the law as it previously existed.
Several decisions construing statutes in the corporations field were
handed down. A number of statutes bearing on corporation prob-
lems were passed by the 50th Legislature.
ULTRA VIRES ACTS
In the case of Vehle v. Wagner,' a corporation with charter
powers prescribed by Article 1302, Section 37, authorizing it to
"contract for, lease, and purchase of right to prospect for, develop
and use coal, petroleum, gas and other minerals," received a non-
participating royalty interest in land in payment for shares of its
non-par value stock. The corporation then sold the interest. The
suit in the instant case was one to recover title to the mineral in-
terest and the defense raised was that any sale of the mineral
interest was void or voidable as being beyond the power of the
corporation as set out in its charter. The Court of Civil Appeals
held that the corporation did have the right to sell this interest,
even though it was not within its charter powers to do so. The
court said this was especially so here since the stockholders of the
corporation had given their authority to sell and in the same meet-
ing had incorporated in the same resolution a statement to the
effect that any act done under that particular resolution was there-
by ratified by them. The point might have been raised here that
stockholders' consent would not necessarily vary the effect of
their corporation's ultra vires contracts except for the fact that
these stockholders not only consented to the sale but expressly
ratified it. This opinion emphasized, however, that the stockholders
I 2)1 S. W. (2d) 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), rehearing denied.
2 Tm. Rzv. Ctv. STAT. (Vernon's 1925), Art. 1302, 1 37.
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could not authorize the corporation to engage in the business of
dealing in mineral interests as this would not only be a clear
violation of the law, but also an attempt to enlarge the charter
powers of the corporation without compliance with the statutory
procedure set up to accomplish this end. The court held that title
to the mineral interest passed by the sale, and that the defense that
the sale was either void or voidable as being ultra vires, was not
available.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
There is nothing new in the proposition that subscriptions to a
corporation's capital stock are capital assets of the corporation,
and upon insolvency, constitute a trust fund for the payment of
the corporate debts. This is true generally and in Texas. The
case of Bartelt v. Lehmann" establishes for the first time when the
statute of limitations begins to run against corporation creditors
coming under the above doctrine, where the unpaid stock subscrip-
tions are evidenced by notes. The Court of Civil Appeals held that
since the rights of creditors against these unpaid subscribers are
measured by the original subscription obligation and not by the
terms of the note, it followed that limitation of an action by credi-
tors to enforce their liability is governed by the date of the
original obligation and not by the due date of the unpaid notes.
The notes, it was said, were only evidence of the subscriber's
obligations.
UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT
Snyder Motor Co. v. Universal Credit Co.' brought up the con-
struction of Section 13 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.' The
section provides:
"... no attachment or lcvy upon shares of stock for which certificate
is outstanding shall he valid until such certificate is actually seized by
a 207 S. W. (2d) 131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), rehearing denied.
4 199 S. W. (2d) 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), rehearing denied.
5 Trx. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon's, 1925), Art. 1358,1 13.
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the officer makirg the attachment or levy; or is surrendered to the
'orjiorationi which issued it: tor its transfer by the holder is enjoined."
The Court of Civil Appeals held, under Section 13, that a levy
of an execution or the service of a writ of garnishment upon the
company issuing the stock is insufficient to pass title or to impound
thestock under a writ of garnishment, unless the stock certificate
is actually seized by the olticer serving the writ. This was so here
even though the stock issuing company had answered that the judg-
met debtor had stock in the company. That this is the correct
interpretation of the section is clear when it is stated that the main
purpose of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act was to make certifi-
cates of corporate stock thle sole representative of the shares which
tley represent.
DISSOLUTION
The case of State v. Dyer' places a clear construction on Article
1387, Section 7." Section 7 states:
"... a corporation is dissolved whenever upon proper judicial ascer-
tainment the corporation is found to be insolvent."
In the Dyer case a creditor of a guaranty company sued for the
appointment of a receiver without any prayer for dissolution.
Thirty years later the state intervened in the receivership pro.
ceedings for the purpose of collecting franchise taxes for that
thirty-year period. The Supreme Court in a judgment for the
state construed "upon proper judicial ascertainment" in the statute
to mean an ascertainment of insolvency only by a direct proceed.
ing for dissolution brought by the state for that purpose under
Article 1380. Under this construction then, since this corporate
insolvency followed by the appointment of a receiver had not dis-
solved the corporation, it was indebted to the state for the back
franchises and penalties. This case shows that the only safe prac-
tice in a situation such as this is to take in each instance the neces-
sary formal steps for dissolution.
. Tex ....... 200 S. W. (2d) 813 (1947).




The present survey would not be complete without noting the
case of Pollock Paper Box Co. v. East Texas Motor Freight Co.'
There the Supreme Court had Rule 949 under construction. The
point raised is of course procedural, but affects suits to which
corporations are a party. The rule says, in effect, that certain
affirmative defenses must be specially pleaded or affirmatively
appear from the plaintiff's allegations. Certain of these defenses
are expressly listed in the rule. But this list is not exclusive as
is seen by the "catch-all" way the rule ends-"and any other
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." The suit
here was one against a motor freight corporation, on account, for
printing waybills. The plaintiff's pleadings failed to show, and
defendant did not specially plead, the defense of ultra vires.
Under the rule in question, the court held that such defense was
not available. This decision makes it clear that the defense of
ultra vires is "matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative de-
fense" within the statute and must be specially pleaded or
affirmatively appear from the plaintiff's pleadings. It cannot be
urged for the first time on appeal.
AGENCY
Subdivision 23 of Article 19950 was in issue in the case of
Texas Power and Light Co. v. Adamson." The suit was an appeal
from an order overruling the defendant's plea of privilege to be
sued in Dallas County set up under Article 1995. The pertinent
part of the subdivision reads:
... suits against a private corporation ... may be brought in any
county... in which such corporation ... has an agency or representa-
tive. . .
8 ...... Tex ........ 201 S. W. (2d) 228,1947.
9 TEXAS RULEs or Civu. PROCWUUE, Rule 94.
1OTgx. Rgv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon's, 1925), Art. 1995, 1 23.
11203 S. W. (2d) 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), rehearing denied.
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The question before the court was whether the evidence suf-
ficiently showed that the defendant corporation had an agency in
Cherokee County within the exception to this venue statute. The
Court of Civil Appeals in construing the subdivision, said that a
"servant" or "employee" is not necesarily an "agent" or "repre-
sentative." Applying that construction to the facts involved it was
held that these persons in the instant case who merely received
voluntary payments of bills and sent in these amounts, and did
no soliciting of payments or collecting of accounts, made no agree-
ments or performed any other services for the company, were
"employees," but not "agents" or "representatives" within the
subdivision of the statute. It would seem then that under this
subdivision of the venue statute, before courts will confer venue
in suits against a private corporation, they will require a clear
showing of agency as distinguished from one who merely per-
forms a limited service.
LEGISLATION
The clearest changes in any field of law are those made by the
legislature. For the most part the 1947 legislation dealing with
corporation law were amendments to Article 130212 which in
general enumerates the purposes for which corporations may be
chartered in Texas. In addition to the long list of existing pur-
poses for which a corporation may be incorporated, they may now
be formed for the purpose of dealing in agricultural commodities,
poultry, dairy products, livestock; the operation of cold storage
plants, warehouses, locker plants; the manufacture of ice and
non-intoxicating beverages and other allied purposes."3
They may be organized to buy, manufacture and sell feeds,
fertilizer, insecticides, fungicides, soaps and cleansers. 4
Subdivision 106 was passed to provide for creation of corpora-
-. Ttx. RFy. CiV. STAT. (Vernon's, 1925), Art. 1302.
"3 Senate Bill 309, 50th Texas Legislature, Reg. Sess., 1947.
"4 Senate Bill 134, 50th Texas Legislature, Reg. Sess., 1947.
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tions for the purposes of operating a general commissary business
and to deal in goods and equipment incident to that business.1"
Another act amended Article 1302 by providing for the creation
of corporations to act as general commercial brokers and as cus-
toms brokers in the United States and foreign countries and to act
as principal or agent in buying or selling merchandise in all
foreign countries and to do general export and import business to
and from the United States.16
Corporations may now be formed for the purpose of engaging
in the business of fighting fires and blowouts in oil and/or gas
wells.7
And finally, of interest to the profession, local bar associations
may now incorporate."8
W.H.P.
11 Senate Bill 101, 50th Texas Legislature, Reg. Sess., 1947.
16 House Bill 304, 50th Texas Legislature, Reg. Sess., 1947.
17 House Bill 590, 50th Texas Legislature, Reg. Sess., 1947.
18 Senate Bill 51, 50th Texas Legislature, Reg. Sess., 1947.
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